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The emergence and quick spread of the COVID-19 pandemic 
has shifted the focus and dynamics of the debates about global 
health, international law, and policy.  This shift has 
overshadowed many of the other controversies in the 
international sphere.  It has also highlighted the tensions that 
often exist in international affairs—especially in understanding 
the place and purpose of international institutions, vis-à-vis 
states, in the general schema of public international law.  
Central to the international response to the current pandemic is 
the World Health Organization (WHO)—a treaty-based 
organization charged with the overarching mandate of ensuring 
“the highest possible level of health” for all peoples.1  
Interestingly, the WHO has also become entangled in a foreign 
policy spat between China and the United States of America.  
This work explores the public international law aspects of the 
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1 Constitution of the World Health Organization [WHO] art. 1, June 22, 
1946, 62 Stat. 2679, 14 U.N.T.S. 185 [hereinafter WHO Const.].  
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WHO and why we should focus on its primary policy mandate 
and avoid unduly heaving the institution into perennial 
strategic policy games of states.  It argues against turning such 
an illustrious institution, charged with a peculiar mandate, into 
an arena of zero-sum competitions amongst states.  The hope is 
that this paper will provide crucial insights and assist legal and 
policy experts in understanding the organization, insulating it 
from unnecessary strategic games of powerful states, and 
ensuring the continued and effective delivery of global health 
policy2 through the WHO. 
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2 In the last two decades, global health has expanded rapidly in the face 
of international community’s needs to respond to transborder communicable 
diseases, such as the flu and other forms of potentially disruptive health 
challenges. See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 8–11 (2005); 
Thomas G. Weiss, Governance, Good Governance and Global Governance: 
Conceptual and Actual Challenges, 21 THIRD WORLD Q. 795, 804 (2000). Also, 
global health governance is part of the larger schema of global governance, 
which has become more expansive since the end of the cold war. SLAUGHTER, 
supra note 2, at 15–16, 42; Weiss, supra note 2, at 804. In the health sector of 
global governance, questions regarding access to medicine and intellectual 
property rights, such as drug patents, are central to the work of the World 
Health Organization, the World Trade Organization, the World Intellectual 
Property Organization, and many others. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & César 
Rodríguez-Garavito, The Battle Over Intellectual Property Laws and Access to 
Medicines in Latin America: A Primer on Global Administrative Law, 
Intellectual Property, and Political Contestation, in BALANCING WEALTH AND 
HEALTH: THE BATTLE OVER INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 
IN LATIN AMERICA 1–2 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & César Rodríguez-Garavito eds., 
2014).  More to this is the heated debate about access to vaccines and how this 
is entangled with the existing regime of intellectual property rights under the 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement.  
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol33/iss2/2
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
The COVID-19 pandemic3 has opened a floodgate of 
dialogues4 and reflections5 about disaster,6 medicine,7 infectious 
diseases,8 human rights, and the World Health Organization 
(WHO)9 as an international organization vis-à-vis its 
 
3 According to the Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center, COVID-
19 has killed more than 2,900,000 people globally. Coronavirus Resource 
Center, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV. MED., https://coronavirus.jhu.edu (last visited 
Mar. 29, 2021). There have also been more than 130,000,000 confirmed cases 
of the virus globally. Id. The devastation is immense, and the harm caused to 
socioeconomic opportunities is yet to be fully articulated. See generally 
Francisco-José Quintana & Justina Uriburu, Modest International Law: 
COVID-19, International Legal Responses, and Depoliticization, 114 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 687 (2020). 
4 See, for example, Miriam Tedeschi, The Body and the Law Across 
Borders During the COVID-19 Pandemic, 10 DIALOGUES HUM. GEOGRAPHY 178, 
178 (2020), which discusses various theories concerning international travel 
amid COVID-19.  
5 See generally Univ. Essex Sch. L. & Hum. Rts. Ctr., Covid-19, Law and 




6 See generally Punidha Kaliaperumal et al., Application of Health-Care 
Networking in COVID-19: A Brief Report, SOC’Y FOR DISASTER MED. & PUB. 





7 See generally Daniel J. Barnett et al., Reexamining Health-Care 
Coalitions in Light of COVID-19, SOC’Y FOR DISASTER MED. & PUB. HEALTH 




8 See generally Rosario M. Isasi & Thu Minh Nguyen, The Global 
Governance of Infectious Diseases: The World Health Organization and the 
International Health Regulations, 43 ALBERTA L. REV. 497 (2005). 
9 See generally CHARLES CLIFT, CHATHAM HOUSE, WHAT’S THE WORLD 
HEALTH ORGANIZATION FOR? (2014); David P. Fidler, The Future of the World 
Health Organization: What Role for International Law?, 31 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1079, 1086–89, 1099–1103, 1107–15 (1998); and Benjamin 
Mason Meire et al., The World Health Organization in Global Health Law, 48 
J. L., MED. & ETHICS 796 (2021), for further discussion on the many roles and 
responsibilities of the World Health Organization. 
3
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overarching mandate in global health policy.10  It has affected 
every aspect of human endeavor11—including the operation of 
international organizations such as the WHO.12  International 
Organizations (IOs) or institutions are set up by states13 and 
garbed with mandates to carry out specific duties within the 
international system.14  These organizations are treaty-based 
 
10 For commentary concerning the criticisms of the World Health 
Organization and the global response to the COVID-19 pandemic, see Lauren 
Tonti, The International Health Regulations: The Past and the Present, But 
What Future? HARV. INT’L L. J., Apr. 9, 2020, https://harvardilj.org/2020/04/the-
international-health-regulations-the-past-and-the-present-but-what-future/; 
Jason Hoffman & Maegan Vazquez, Trump announces end of US relationship 
with World Health Organization, CNN (May 29, 2020, 7:17 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/29/politics/donald-trump-world-health-
organization/index.html; Zachary Cohen et al., Trump administration begins 
formal withdrawal from World Health Organization, CNN (July 8, 2020, 4:53 
AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/07/politics/us-withdrawing-world-health-
organization/index.html; Press Release, White House, Off. Press Sec’y, 
President Donald J. Trump is Demanding Accountability from the World 
Health Organization (Apr. 15, 2020) (on file with U.S. Dep’t of State archives); 
Thomas J. Bollyky & David P. Fidler, It’s Time for an Independent Coronavirus 
Review: The World Health Organization and Its Member States Must Learn 
From Their Mistakes, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Apr. 24, 2020), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-04-24/its-time-
independent-coronavirus-review; and Lawrence O. Gostin, Roojin Habibi & 
Benjamin Mason Meier, Has Global Health Law Risen to Meet the COVID-19 
Challenge? Revisiting the International Health Regulations to Prepare for 
Future Threats, 48 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 376 (2020). 
11 See, e.g., Amin R. Yacoub & Mohamed S. El-Zomor, Would COVID-19 
Be the Turning Point in History for the Globalization Era? The Short-Term and 
Long-Term Impact of COVID-19 on Globalization (Apr. 6, 2020), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3570142 (discussing 
social, political, legal and economic impacts of COVID-19 on globalization); 
Maureen A. Weston, COVID-19’s Lasting Impact on the Sports Industry: 
Financial, Legal, and Innovation, 61 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 121 (2020) 
(analyzing financial, legal, and other impacts of COVID-19 on the sports 
industry). 
12 See generally EDUARDO MISSONI, GUGLIELMO PACILEO & FABRIZIO 
TEDIOSI, GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE AND POLICY 83–126 (2019), for 
background information regarding the origins, structure, and functions of 
various international organizations, including the World Health Organization, 
and their relation to global health. 
13 José E. Alvarez, International Organizations and Their Exercise of 
Sovereign Powers, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 674, 674 (2007) (book review). 
14 Andrew Guzman, International Organizations and the Frankenstein 
Problem, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 999, 1010 (2013); see Jan Klabbers, Reflections on 
Role Responsibility: The Responsibility of International Organizations for 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol33/iss2/2
2021 COVID-19 and Global Health Policy 193 
organizations with mandates15 that are spelled out in their 
charters or constitutive instruments.16  These mandates often 
determine the spheres of activities to which they must restrict 
themselves, subject to the overriding superintendence of 
Member States.17  In other words, these organizations are 
special-purpose instruments18 and platforms through which the 
international community conceives, designs, and implements 
 
Failing to Act, 28 EUR. J. INT’L L., 1133, 1135 (2017); Martti Koskenniemi, 
Global Governance and Public International Law, 37 KRITISCHE JUSTIZ 241, 
242 (2004). Sometimes, the term “international organization” is also 
colloquially used to describe non-governmental organizations, such as 
Amnesty International and Transparency International, that do not enjoy the 
same status as the International Organizations like the United Nations (UN) 
or its Specialized Agencies, such as the WHO, that are created by states with 
treaty instruments. While organizations like Amnesty International are 
registered as charities, in different jurisdictions, IOs like WHO are constituted 
by states through treaties, (constitutions, charters, agreements) and thus have 
international legal personality. This work’s focus is on those institutions 
constituted by states. See generally Steve Charnovitz, Nongovernmental 
Organizations and International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 348 (2006), for 
further explanation on non-governmental organizations and their relationship 
with international organizations. 
15 See Benedict Kingsbury & Lorenzo Casini, Global Administrative Law 
Dimensions of International Organizations Law, 6 INT’L ORGS. L. REV. 319, 330 
(2009). 
16 Catherine Brölmann, Specialized Rules of Treaty Interpretation: 
International Organizations, in OXFORD GUIDES FOR TREATIES 507, 509 
(Duncan B. Hollis ed., 2012); see also Peter Quayle, Treaties of a Particular 
Type: The ICJ's Interpretative Approach to the Constituent Instruments of 
International Organizations, 29 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 853, 869–70 (2016) 
(discussing the International Court of Justice’s interpretation of the United 
Nations Charter in adjudicating disputes); Raleigh C. Minor, Professor of Int’l 
L., Univ. of Va., Address at the Eleventh Ann. Meeting of the Am. Soc’y of Int’l 
L.: International Organization: Constitution of a Legislative Body (Apr. 26–28, 
1917), in 11 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L  L. AT ITS ANN. MEETING, 
1917, at 56, 63–64 (proposing the idea that IOs be empowered to enact binding 
legislation in certain specified areas). These constitutive acts can also be 
referred to as constitutions, charters, and agreements. 
17 Jan Klabbers, The Paradox of International Institutional Law, 5 INT’L 
ORGS. L. REV. 151, 165 (2008); Kristina Daugirdas, How and Why International 
Law Binds International Organizations, 57 HARV. INT’L L. J. 325, 345 (2016). 
18 See Daugirdas, supra note 17, at 342–57, who highlights the vertical 
relationship between international organizations and states such that they are 
vehicles for the carryout of the intentions of constitutive states.  
5
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policies that have a common purpose for all members.19 
Before World War II and the consequent establishment of 
the UN System,20 few IOs had a worldwide mandate.  They 
included such organizations as the League of Nations,21 the 
Universal Postal Union (UPU),22 and the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU).23  These organizations 
 
19 See, for example, Andreas Rasche & Georg Kell, Introduction: the 
United Nations Global Compact – Retrospect and Prospect, in UNITED NATIONS 
GLOBAL COMPACT: ACHIEVEMENTS, TRENDS AND CHALLENGES 1, 4 (Andreas 
Rasche & Georg Kell eds., 2010), regarding the United Nation’s Global 
Compact, which is a “call to companies to voluntarily align their operations 
with ten universal principles in the areas of human rights, labour standards, 
the environment and anti-corruption.”  
20 MARTIN HILL, THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM: COORDINATING ITS 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL WORK 11 (1978). 
21 For background information on the League of Nations, see generally 
J. L. Brierly & P.A. Reynolds, The League of Nations, in 12 NEW CAMBRIDGE 
MODERN HISTORY: THE SHIFTING BALANCE OF WORLD FORCES 242, 242–68 (C. L. 
Mowat ed., 2d ed. 1968); The League of Nations, 1 INT'L ORG. 141, 141–42 
(1947); WILLIAM G. ROSS, WORLD WAR I AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 319–
66 (2017); Manley O. Hudson, Membership in the League of Nations, 18 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 436, 436–58 (1924); and F. H. HINSLEY, POWER AND THE PURSUIT OF 
PEACE: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE HISTORY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN 
STATES 309–22 (1963). 
22 See generally Logan Nagle, Going Postal: President Trump and the 
United States' Tumultuous Current Relationship with the Universal Postal 
Union, and Its Effect on the International Shipment of Opioids, 8 PENN STATE 
J. L. & INT’L AFFS. 264, 268, 278–81, 304–11 (2020); and Douglas Howland, 
Japan and the Universal Postal Union: An Alternative Internationalism in the 
19th Century, 17 SOC. SCI. JAPAN J. 23, 26–28, 32–36 (2014), for discussions of 
the history of the Universal Postal Union (UPU), the costs and benefits of being 
a UPU Member Country, and the UPU’s relationship with both the United 
States and Japan.   
23 For background and insight into the structure and makeup of the 
International Telecommunication Union, see generally Hugo H. Siblesz, The 
International Telecommunication Union and its Legal Structure, 36 NETH. 
INT’L L. REV. 364, 364–75 (1989); and J. Henry Glazer, The Law-Making 
Treaties of the International Telecommunication Union Through Time and in 
Space, 60 MICH. L. REV. 269, 271–73, 279–84 (1962). Even then, many of these 
pioneer institutions in international law and governance were constituted by 
European states at inception. DAVID MACKENZIE, A WORLD BEYOND BORDERS: 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 90 (2010); 
VICTOR-YVES GHEBALI, THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION: A CASE 
STUDY ON THE EVOLUTION OF U.N. SPECIALIZED AGENCIES 20–21 (Roberto Ago & 
Nicolas Valticos eds., 1989); Pitman B. Potter, Editorial Comment, The United 
Nations Charter and the Covenant of the League of Nations, 39 AM. J. INT’L 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol33/iss2/2
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enjoyed widespread acceptance and support despite their 
humble beginnings.  The post-1945 era of international law and 
policy has seen a definitive shift in the nature, number, and 
reach of international organizations.24  There has been a 
manifest expansion of these organizations—both in number and 
subjects of influence.25  In a way, the evolution and expansion of 
international institutions, “the move to institutions,”26 must be 
seen as one of the most phenomenal iterations of international 
law development in the 20th century.27  In that century, they 
became very relevant in helping humanity achieve some 
common goals, including international peace and security,28 
 
L. 546, 548–51 (1945). 
24 Kal Raustiala, Institutional Proliferation and the International Legal 
Order, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 293, 315 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., 
2012); MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1282–84 (6th ed. 2008); see also 
Antony Anghie, International Financial Institutions, in THE POLITICS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW  217, 229–35 (Christian Reus-Smit ed., 2004) (examining 
the shift in international financial institutions over time).  Many types of 
institutions have been set up and given mandates in different spheres of 
international law and policy.  The United Nations and its Specialized Agencies 
are prominent in this regard.   
25 See Jan Klabbers, The EJIL Forward: The Transformation of 
International Organizations Law, 26 EUR. J. INT’L L. 9 (2015), which explores 
how the theory of functionalism explains the transformation of international 
organizations in international law. 
26 See generally David Kennedy, The Move to Institutions, 8 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 841, 860 (1987).  
27 See generally José E. Alvarez, International Organizations: Then and 
Now, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 324 (2006). 
28 See, for example, IAN HURD, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: POLITICS, 
LAW, PRACTICE 82–86 (3d ed. 2017), which discusses the Security Council, an 
organ of the United Nations charged with the obligation to maintain 
international peace and security. See U.N. Charter arts. 39–51.  
 
7
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trade,29 nuclear arms,30 food, and healthcare.31  The rapidity of 
their growth simultaneously added layers of complexity32 to the 
array of activities and functions that necessitated these 
organizations’ establishment.33 
Against the backdrop of the interdependence of states and 
societies in our globalized world, IOs have become even more 
crucial in the overall architecture of global consensus building 
and policy.34 The entrenchment of IOs is now a common fixture 
of the in international law and policy landscape.  Illustrative of 
this is the role that the WHO has played in the current effort to 
contain and stop the COVID-19 pandemic.35  Even before the 
current pandemic, the WHO has been working with member 
states and many professional bodies to develop a reliable 
framework for managing and generally combating infectious 
 
29 See Gabrielle Marceau, From the GATT to the WTO: The Expanding 
Duties of the Legal Affairs Division in Non-Panel Matters, in A HISTORY OF LAW 
AND LAWYERS IN THE GATT/WTO 244, 244–63 (Gabrielle Marceau ed., 2015), 
who explains the transition of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) to the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the subsequent strategic 
and ethical improvements which helped shape modern international trade. 
30 Leonard C. Meeker, Assistant Legal Advisor, Dep’t of State, Address 
at the Am. Soc’y of Int’l L. at Its Fifty-First Ann. Meeting: The International 
Atomic Energy Agency (Apr. 25–27, 1957), in 51 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. SOC’Y 
OF INT’L L. ANN. MEETING, 1957, at 155, 155–58; Eric C. Stein, Univ. of Mich. L. 
Sch., Address at the Am. Soc’y of Int’l L. at Its Fifty-First Ann. Meeting: The 
New International Atomic Energy Agency (Apr. 25–27, 1957), in 51 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. AT ITS ANN. MEETING, 1957, at 158–
70. 
31 JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ON 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 216 (2017). 
32 See generally Karen J. Alter & Kal Raustiala, The Rise of 
International Regime Complexity, 14 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 329, 329–49 
(2018).  
33 JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 9 
(2005).  
34 Alexander Betts, Regime Complexity and International Organizations: 
UNHCR as a Challenged Institution, 19 GLOB. GOVERNANCE 69, 71 (2013). 
35 Even before Covid-19, scholars had already started articulating the 
development of international health law and the role of the WHO in 
formulating policies and instigating the crystallization of norms and practices 
in this area, which cannot be over emphasized. See Brigit Toebes, International 
Health Law: An Emerging Field of Public International Law, 55 INDIAN J. INT’L 
L. 299, 305–08 (2015); Jennifer Prah Ruger, Normative Foundations of Global 
Health Law, 96 GEO. L. J. 423, 424 (2008). 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol33/iss2/2
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diseases.36  Thus, the WHO’s role in the current pandemic arises 
from the fact that no single nation,37 no matter how rich or 
powerful, is capable of solving the pandemic problem without 
collaboration38 with other states.39  It requires a high level of 
committed cooperation between states and IOs, which may 
sometimes generate diplomatic40 frictions.41  Therefore, it is 
 
36 DAVID P. FIDLER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES 59 
(1999); Tsion Berhane Ghedamu & Benjamin Mason Meier, Assessing National 
Public Health Law to Prevent Infectious Disease Outbreaks: Immunization Law 
as a Basis for Global Health Security, 47 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 412, 413 (2019).  
37 See Matiangai Sirleaf, Responsibility for Epidemics, 97 TEX. L. REV. 
285, 298 (2018), who highlights the critical question of responsibility for 
epidemics in international law and explains why no single state alone can cope 
with the increased incidents of epidemics. 
38 Dominique Vervoort, Xiya Ma & Jessica G. Y. Luc, COVID-19 
Pandemic: A Time for Collaboration and a Unified Global Health Front, 33 
INT’L J. QUALITY HEALTH CARE 1, 2–3 (2021); see also Gian Luca Burci, Health 
and Infectious Disease, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE UNITED NATIONS 679, 
683–87 (Thomas G. Weiss & Sam Daws eds., 2d ed. 2018) (detailing the 
shortcomings of individual organizations in combatting previous pandemics, 
which led to a transfer of responsibility from solely the WHO to other 
international organizations to complement one another and ensure future 
support for early stages of outbreak response). 
39 Press Release, Secretary-General, Stronger Multilateralism Needed 
as Pandemic Reveals ‘Increasingly Interdependent, Increasingly Fragile’ 
World, Secretary-General Tells Economic and Social Council, U.N. Press 
Release SG/SM/20178 (July 17, 2020); see also World Health Organization 
[WHO], Report by the Director-General, Communicable Disease Prevention 
and Control: New, Emerging, and Re-emerging Infectious Diseases, at 3, WHO 
Doc. A48/15 (Feb. 22, 1995) (stressing the importance of a global plan and 
strengthening global surveillance).  
40 Heath as diplomacy is a strong theme within the larger legal academy 
in America. This is hardly surprising considering the American approaches to 
international law, which is foreign relations oriented. This exceptionalism 
applies across the board to all aspects of international law. See generally 
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE U.S. (AM. L. INST. 
2017). Fidler considers the shift that has happened in recent years in terms of 
international healthy policy to be revolutionary. See David P. Fidler, Health as 
Foreign Policy: Between Principle and Power, 6 WHITEHEAD J. DIPL. & INT’L 
RELS. 179, 180–82 (2005). For more on American approaches to international 
law, see MARK WESTON JANIS, THE AMERICAN TRADITION OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: GREAT EXPECTATIONS 1789–1914 (2004); HATSUE SHINOHARA, US 
INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS IN THE INTERWAR YEARS: A FORGOTTEN CRUSADE 
(2012); and David Kennedy & Chris Tennant, New Approaches to International 
Law: A Bibliography, 35 HARV. INT’L L. J. 417 (1994). 
41 The little spat between the People’s Republic of China and the United 
States Government is a case in point. See Li Yuan, Ousting U.S. Reporters, 
9
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imperative to refocus the public’s mind on the policy foundations 
and institutional framework of the WHO.  That way, it will be 
easy to show the need to avoid zero-sum strategic games42 within 
the institution.  It is hoped that participants in global health 
policy will be able to eschew zero-sum games and concentrate on 
the international and imperative duty of ensuring the highest 
possible standard of health for humankind.43 
II.  FOUNDATIONS, AND PRINCIPLES OF THE WORLD HEALTH 
ORGANIZATION  
As a treaty-based institution, the WHO is also recognized 
under Articles 57 and 63 of the UN Charter as a Specialized 
Agency of the UN.44  It was established in 1946 and became fully 
 
China Signals Confidence in Its Own Message, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/18/business/china-media-reporters-
eject.html; Andrew Jacobs, Michael D. Shear & Edward Wong, U.S.-China 
Feud Over Coronavirus Erupts at World Health Assembly, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/18/health/coronavirus-who-china-
trump.html; Michael D.  Shear & Andrew Jacobs, W.H.O. Members Reject 
Trump’s Demands but Agree to Study Its Virus Response, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/19/us/politics/trump-who-
coronavirus.html.  
42 International Organizations are also exposed to the politics of 
international law and general international relations. These organizations 
play a role in who gets what and how that is done amongst nations. This can 
implicate issues that touch on the most vital aspects of human wellbeing, such 
as health and transnational management of pandemics. Hence the need to 
emphasize theories of cooperation rather than zero-sum power politics among 
nations. For general insights on theories of international law which permeate 
the adjacent subject of international organizations, see Jack L. Goldsmith & 
Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 
1113 (1999); Mark A. Chinen, Game Theory and Customary International Law: 
A Response to Professors Goldsmith and Posner, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 143 (2001); 
and Moshe Hirsch, Game Theory, International Law, and Future 
Environmental Cooperation in the Middle East, 27 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 75 
(1998). 
43 WHO Const., supra note 1, art. 1.  
44 See Gustav Pollaczek, The United Nations and Specialized Agencies, 
40 AM. J. INT’L L. 592, 610 (1946). The text of Article 57, which falls under 
Chapter IX of the UN Charter, which deals with International Economic and 
Social Cooperation, provides that “[t]he various specialized agencies, 
established by intergovernmental agreement and having wide international 
responsibilities, as defined in their basic instruments, in economic, social, 
cultural, educational, health, and related fields, shall be brought into 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol33/iss2/2
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operational in 1948, pursuant to a series of consultations, 
diplomatic regulations, and due ratification of its constitution by 
Member States.  The WHO conceptualizes health as being more 
than just bodily infirmity; it connotes total wellbeing and 
happiness of all peoples.45  This overarching conceptualization of 
health animates proactive measures that help in investigating 
potential health challenges and the onset of diseases and drives 
the agenda for solutions and social engagements.  Beyond the 
clinical work of combating diseases, the WHO also coordinates 
and channels efforts aimed at public enlightenment and public 
health enhancement.46  The WHO’s constitution and other 
instruments acknowledge “the highest attainable standard of 
health” as a basic fundamental right “without distinction 
[regarding] race, religion, political belief, [and] economic or 
social condition.”47 
The WHO enjoys a widespread membership.48  This coming 
together of states for the common purpose of global health 
support and governance traces its roots to the International 
Health Conference held in New York in 1946.49  Since then, the 
WHO has provided states with the necessary platform for 
solving critical cross-border and transnational health problems 
such as the COVID-19 pandemic.50  In recent years, the WHO 
 
relationship with the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of 
Article 63.” U.N. Charter art. 57, ¶ 1. “Such agencies thus brought into 
relationship with the United Nations are [generally] referred to as specialized 
agencies.” Id. ¶ 2.  
45 WHO Const., supra note 1, pmbl. 
46 Jennifer Prah Ruger & Derek Yach, The Global Role of the World 
Health Organization, GLOB. HEALTH GOVERNANCE, Apr. 2009, at 1, 2. 
47 WHO Const., supra note 1, pmbl. These WHO principles align with 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 25 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
48 See generally Niels Blokker, International Organizations and Their 
Members, 1 INT’L ORG. L. REV. 139 (2004), for a discussion on the role of 
members of international organizations. 
49 Walter R. Sharp, The New World Health Organization, 41 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 509, 509 (1947). 
50 See Antoine de Bengy Puyvallée & Sonja Kittelsen, “Disease Knows 
No Borders”: Pandemics and the Politics of Global Health Security, in 
PANDEMICS, PUBLICS, AND POLITICS: STAGING RESPONSES TO PUBLIC HEALTH 
CRISES 59, 60–61, 63–64 (Kristian Bjørkdahl & Benedicte Carlsen eds., 2019). 
For one example, see WHO, HANDBOOK FOR PUBLIC HEALTH CAPACITY-BUILDING 
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has pivoted towards playing a more significant role in combating 
infectious diseases,51 and this has yielded a strong collaboration 
across states when diseases like Ebola52 or COVID-19 emerge.53  
It has also continued to facilitate global health policy54 without 
distinction regarding race, religion, region, or nationality.55  The 
 
AT GROUND CROSSINGS AND CROSS-BORDER COLLABORATION (2020). 
51 See, for example, David P. Fidler, Influenza Virus Samples, 
International Law, and Global Health Diplomacy, 14 EMERGING INFECTIOUS 
DISEASES 88 (2008), which addresses the WHO’s response to issues of 
international virus sample sharing; Lawrence Gostin, The International 
Health Regulations and Beyond, 4 LANCET: INFECTIOUS DISEASES 606, 606–07 
(2004), which highlights the WHO’s proposed revisions of the International 
Health Regulations; FIDLER, supra note 36, at 25, which notes the effectiveness 
of the WHO’s creation and promulgation of the International Sanitary 
Regulations; and Christopher-Paul Milne, Racing the Globalization of 
Infectious Diseases: Lessons from the Tortoise and the Hare, 11 NEW ENG. J. 
INT’L & COMPAR. L. 1, 34–35 (2004), which promotes the adoption and support 
of WHO’s biosecurity guidelines. 
52 World Health Organization [WHO], Report by the Director-General, 
Implementation of the International Health Regulations (2005): Report of the 
Review Committee on the Role of the International Health Regulations (2005) 
in the Ebola Outbreak and Response, ¶¶ 6, 9–10, WHO Doc. A69/21 (May 13, 
2016); Bruce J. Plotkin & Maxwell C. Hardiman, Infectious Disease 
Surveillance and the International Health Regulations, in INFECTIOUS DISEASE 
SURVEILLANCE 62, 64–74 (Nkuchia M. M’ikanatha et al. eds., 2d ed. 2013). 
53 See generally David P. Fidler, International Law and Global Health, 
48 KAN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1999); David Fidler, Global Health Governance: Overview 
of the Role of International Law in Protecting and Promoting Global Public 
Health, DEP’T OF HEALTH & DEV. FOR THE WORLD HEALTH ORG. [WHO] (2002), 
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/68936/A85729_eng.pdf?sequ
ence=1&isAllowed=y; and David P. Fidler, From International Sanitary 
Conventions to Global Health Security: The New International Health 
Regulations, 4 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 325 (2005), which all survey the history of 
international law relating to infectious disease control as well as the 
substantive changes that the WHO’s International Health Regulations (IHR) 
have had on international infectious disease law, creating a new regime for 
addressing public health issues.  
54 See David P. Fidler & Lawrence O. Gostin, The New International 
Health Regulations: An Historic Development for International Law and Public 
Health, 33 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 85, 93 (2006).  
55 See generally OBIJIOFOR AGINAM, GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PUBLIC HEALTH IN A DIVIDED WORLD 64–70 (2005).  
Scholars have recognized the emergent field of global health governance as 
indicative of this overarching need for health policies that go beyond nation 
states. See Lawrence O. Gostin & Allyn L. Taylor, Global Health Law: A 
Definition and Grand Challenges, 1 PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 53, 53 (2008). 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol33/iss2/2
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WHO also aids many developing countries56 to leverage 
expertise, aid, healthcare support, and other technical 
engagements essential to their well-being and flourishing.57  
Thus, the WHO's collaborative platform enhances the epidemic 
and pandemic response and management capacity of these 
states in ways that would have been impossible if they were to 
act alone.  In the COVID-19 era, where many state economies 
were devastated, the value of this shared responsibility58 against 
pandemics such as COVID-19 through the WHO is self-
evident.59 
It is the Constitution of the WHO that governs the 
relationship between the organization and Member States.60  It 
 
56 Highly indebted poor countries have the more difficult challenge of 
managing pandemics because of not only limited infrastructure but also the 
funding capacity to meet the demands of such sudden and sometimes fast 
spreading diseases. See Peter S. Goodman, How the Wealthy World Has Failed 
Poor Countries During the Pandemic, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/01/business/coronavirus-imf-world-
bank.html. The WHO often provides the needed support for these countries in 
negotiating for aid and health care.   
57 WHO’s work with countries, What WHO does in countries, WORLD 
HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/country-cooperation/what-who-does/en/ 
(last visited Apr. 2, 2021). 
58 For an example on the implementation of shared responsibility, see 
Sirleaf, supra note 37, at 341.  
59 Article 79 of the WHO Constitution provides that “States may become 
parties to th[e] Constitution by: (i) signature without reservation as to 
approval; (ii) signature subject to approval followed by acceptance; or (iii) 
acceptance.”  WHO Const., supra note 1, art 79(a)(i)–(iii). Acceptance is 
accomplished by the formal deposit of an instrument with the Office of the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations. Id. art 79(b). Following this 
procedure, the WHO has today grown to include more than 190 Member States. 
World Health Organization [WHO], WHO Presence in Countries, Territories 
and Areas, ¶ 4, WHO Doc. EB144/INF./4 (Jan. 25, 2019), 
https://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/EB144/B144_INF4-en.pdf. Beyond the 
full Member States, the WHO allows territories that are either non-self-
governing or that do not control their own foreign policy to become associate 
members of the WHO. See id. Today, Puerto Rico and Tokelau—both non-self-
governing territories of the United States and New Zealand—are the two 
associate members of the WHO. Id. 
60 See generally Sharp, supra note 49. The Constitution, which was 
adopted in June 1946, has undergone four amendments—resolutions 
WHA26.37, WHA29.38, WHA39.6 and WHA51.23–which came into effect on 
February 3, 1977, January 20, 1984, July 11, 1994 and September 15, 2005 
13
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comprises 19 Chapters and 82 Articles encapsulating the vision 
and rules regulating the WHO's activities and operations and is 
the largest international health policy body on the planet.61  
More importantly, the Constitution accords legal personality to 
the WHO.  Together with the UN's other specialized agencies, 
the Constitution’s legal character is guaranteed to enable it to 
fulfill the functions as specified or implied by their constitutive 
instruments.62  The ICJ has espoused the WHO’s legal 
personality in the case of the Legality of the Use by a State of 
Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict.63 
 
respectively. WHO Const., supra note 1, at 1 n.1. Some of these revisions have 
been critiqued for further intruding into the traditional domain of state 
sovereign powers. See Eric Mack, The World Health Organization’s New 
International Health Regulations: Incursion on State Sovereignty and Ill-Fated 
Response to Global Health Issues, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 365, 366 (2006); David P. 
Fidler, Revision of the World Health Organization’s International Health 
Regulations, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.: INSIGHTS (Apr. 16, 2004), 
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/8/issue/8/revision-world-health-
organizations-international-health-regulations.  
61 See generally WHO Const., supra note 1. 
62 Different schools of thought have arisen in consideration of this legal 
status of international organizations. James D. Fry, Rights, Functions, and 
International Legal Personality of International Organizations, 36 B.U. INT’L 
L. J. 221, 228 (2018). First is the objective personality school, which argues 
that once the international organization is created by states, there emerges an 
objective legal personality of the organization. Id. Thus created, the 
organization automatically acquires a legal personality capable of being so 
recognized not only by member states of the organization but also by the 
general public. Id. at 228–29. This enhances certainty and this personality is 
opposable to all states as an objective criterion. See id. Second, the subjective 
school of thought insists that the legal personality of an international 
organization must be found within the text of the treaty or constitutive 
instrument establishing the organization. Id. at 228. It is reluctant to 
accommodate implied or functionally driven powers. See id. This is often used 
to hedge against “mission creep” or incremental expansion of the powers of an 
international organization. See id. The moderate school conceives the legal 
personality of an international organization as either expressly provided or 
impliedly possessed. Id. at 229. It is also the case that legal personality is 
considered as a unit. See id. Thus, when an international organization binds 
itself to a treaty or any other form of agreement, it also binds all its organs and 
subsidiaries. See id. For a full analysis on legal personality in international 
law, see ROLAND PORTMAN, LEGAL PERSONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010).  
63 Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, 
Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 66, ¶ 21 (July 8). 
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol33/iss2/2
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III. THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION AND PANDEMICS 
In line with its mandate, the WHO is always at the frontline 
of the fight against all kinds of diseases, including pandemics64 
like COVID-19.  Over the years, the organization has developed 
great human and institutional capacity to strategically deal with 
emerging diseases—while preparing for new threats from 
anywhere around the world.  It has developed archives, 
research, guidelines,65 management plans,66 networks, and 
partnerships,67 that can be revved up at short notices in order to 
fulfill its objective of  
providing the highest attainable standard of health for all 
peoples.  In the face of the current struggle to contain and 
eliminate the ongoing deadly pandemic, the strategic position of 
the organization in global health policy has manifested once 
more. 
The method the WHO used to address this and other 
pandemics is to produce a strategic action plan.68  These plans 
 
64 See Pandemic Influenza Risk Management: A WHO Guide to Inform 
& Harmonize National & International Pandemic Preparedness and Response, 
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] (2017), 
https://www.who.int/influenza/preparedness/pandemic/PIRM_update_052017
.pdf, which outlines national influenza preparedness and response plans for all 
countries.  
65 See, for example, WHO & PATIENT SAFETY, WHO GUIDELINES ON HAND 
HYGIENE IN HEALTH CARE (2009), which provides “hospital administrators and 
health authorities with . . . specific recommendations to improve and reduce 
transmission of pathogenic microorganisms to patients and [hospital care 
workers]”; and World Health Org. [WHO], Report by the Secretariat, Pandemic 
Influenza Preparedness: Sharing of Influenza Viruses and Access to Vaccines 
and Other Benefits, annex, ¶ 6, WHO Doc. EB126/4 (Dec. 10, 2009), which 
summarizes the finalization of guidelines for the development of a vaccine 
sharing network. 
66 See generally WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO GUIDANCE FOR 
SURVEILLANCE DURING AN INFLUENZA PANDEMIC (2017) (providing Member 
States with significant guidance for managing an influenza outbreak). 
67 For example, the Asia Pacific Strategy for Emerging Diseases and 
Public Health Emergencies (APSED III) was formulated by the WHO in 
collaboration with Member States from the Asian region to enhance 
collaboration and strengthen preparedness and responses to outbreaks of 
public health emergencies. See WHO, ASIA PACIFIC STRATEGY FOR EMERGING 
DISEASES AND PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES (2017). 
68 See generally Benjamin Mason Meier et al., Examining National 
Public Health Law to Realize the Global Health Security Agenda, 25 MED. L. 
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are often aimed at reducing exposure to the disease, providing 
for and enhancing timely warning protocols, operationalizing 
containment strategies, providing for capacity building to cope 
with the pandemic, and coordinating global scientific research69 
and development.70  Thus, upon the onset of the COVID-19 
pandemic, the WHO produced and publicized a Strategic 
Preparedness and Response Plan.71  This plan was aimed at 
providing a holistic approach to managing the pandemic and all 
other matters related to it.72  It is also complemented by the 
Global Humanitarian Response Plan73 that is meant to cater to 
situations of fragility—involving refugees and internally 
displaced persons around the world.74  Central to the strategic 
plan was implementing the transmission of the pandemic by 
identifying, isolating, and optimizing care for those already 
infected.75  
 
REV. 240, 240–69 (2017) (discussing the background, development, and 
framework of the Global Health Security Agenda—an action plan developed by 
national governments and international organizations, including the WHO, to 
address infectious disease threats). 
69 See, for example, World Health Org. [WHO], Rep. of the Special 
Session of the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework Advisory Grp., 
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness: Sharing of Influenza Viruses and Access to 
Vaccines and Other Benefits, WHO Doc. A69/22 Add.1 (Apr. 1, 2016), 
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/252678/A69_22Add1-
en.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y, which addresses the Pandemic Influenza 
Preparedness (PIP) Framework—a mechanism developed by Member States 
and used to bring Member States, industry, other stakeholders, and WHO 
together to design a global preparedness and response plan for addressing the 
influenza pandemic. 
70 See generally World Health Org. [WHO], WHO Strategic Action Plan 
for Pandemic Influenza, WHO Doc. WHO/CDS/EPR/GIP/2006.2 (2007), 
https://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/influenza/StregPlanEPR_GIP
_2006_2.pdf?ua=1.  
71 See generally 2019 Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV): Strategic 
Preparedness and Response Plan, WORLD HEALTH ORG. [WHO] (2020), 
https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/srp-04022020.pdf 
[hereinafter WHO COVID-19 Response Plan]. 
72 See id. at 1. 
73 U.N. Off. for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affs., Global 
Humanitarian Response Plan COVID-19, at 5, 24–28 (Apr.–Dec. 2020), 
https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/Global-Humanitarian-Response-
Plan-COVID-19.pdf [hereinafter OCHA COVID-19 Glob. Response Plan]. 
74 Id. at 4–5.  
75 Id. at 12. 
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Early and consistent communication to the general public is 
deemed an essential pandemic preparedness and management 
technique.76  This is intended to clearly communicate the critical 
risks, hence alleviating the socioeconomic impact of the disease.  
This multi-sectoral up-to-date strategic communication 
approach77 has ensured that no gap is left in the effort to contain 
and eliminate the deadly pandemic.  Indeed, the Director-
General’s consistent briefings and calls to action have been 
central to the efforts of states and regional organizations in 
responding to the disease.  
Indeed, the WHO has also produced and continued to use a 
strategic communication guideline.78  The guideline emphasizes 
assessment, coordination, transparency, listening during an 
outbreak, communication evaluation, and constructing an 
emergency communication plan.79  This proved critical to the 
effective management of pandemics,80 and the WHO guide 
provides a robust template for governments, regional 
organizations, and other collaborative agencies in the fight 
against epidemics and other forms of infectious diseases.81 
 
76 See Eric E. Johnson & Theodore C. Bailey, Legal Lessons from a Very 
Fast Problem: COVID-19, 73 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 89, 90–96 (2020), who argue 
in favor of free flow of information as an important strategy for managing the 
outbreak of pandemics like COVID-19. 
77 WHO COVID-19 Response Plan, supra note 71, at 5. In a nutshell, the 
WHO, in response to the disease, established an international coordinating 
center to provide technical support and partnerships in support of countries. 
Id. at 5–6. It also accelerated and gave priority to research about the disease. 
Id. at 5, 17. This has been the preoccupation of the WHO since the onset of the 
disease. Id. at 1. 
78 See generally WHO, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION OUTBREAK 
COMMUNICATION PLANNING GUIDE (2008) [hereinafter WHO OUTBREAK 
COMMC’N PLAN. GUIDE]. 
79 Id. at 8–28.  
80 See generally WHO, COMMUNICATING RISK IN PUBLIC HEALTH 
EMERGENCIES: A WHO GUIDE FOR EMERGENCY RISK COMMUNICATION (ERC) 
POLICY AND PRACTICE 10–15 (2017). 
81 Experts are in agreement that effective health communication is 
indispensable to the management of pandemics. See generally Abbigail J. 
Tumpey, David Daigle & Glen Nowak, Communicating During an Outbreak or 
Public Health Investigation, in CDC FIELD EPIDEMIOLOGY MANUAL 243 (Sonja 
A. Rasmussen & Richard A. Goodman eds., 2019); Barbara Reynolds & Sandra 
Crouse Quinn, Commentary, Effective Communication During an Influenza 
17
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More so, the WHO has remained on the frontlines in terms 
of the ongoing efforts aimed at producing vaccines for the 
disease, distributing them, and ensuring that they are properly 
administered.82  Because of the great capacities of the WHO, it 
not only has a team of researchers that work on vaccine 
development, standardization and regulation, it also advises 
drug regulatory authorities, health departments, and officials 
around the world on vaccines.83  Without the WHO's effective 
involvement, many countries and populations around the world 
will face the risk of either lack of access or inappropriate use of 
drugs—especially vaccines.84  In times of uncertainty and 
rapidly evolving pandemics, the WHO plays a critical role in 
keeping the general public informed about vaccine development, 
access,85 and application.  The vital aspects of the WHO's work—
 
Pandemic: The Value of Using a Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication 
Framework, 9 HEALTH PROMOTION PRAC. 13S (2008); BARBARA REYNOLDS & 
MATTHEW SEEGER, CRISIS AND EMERGENCY RISK COMMUNICATION (Ctr. for 
Disease Control & Prevention et al. eds., 2014). See also VINCENT T. COVELLO, 
RISK AND CRISIS COMMUNICATION: 77 QUESTIONS COMMONLY ASKED BY 
JOURNALISTS DURING A CRISIS (2002), 
http://www.nwcphp.org/docs/pdf/journalist.pdf (outlining specific questions for 
effective risk and crisis communication).  
82 See, for example, Geofrey Makenga et al., Vaccine Production in 
Africa: A Feasible Business Model for Capacity Building and Sustainable New 
Vaccine Introduction, FRONTIERS PUB. HEALTH, Mar. 2019, at 1, 3, which 
highlights the WHO’s assessment of Africa’s National Regulatory Authorities 
(NRAs) in 2010, which contributed to substantial vaccine development. For 
example, in collaboration of public and private organizations, such as UNICEF, 
GAVI, and the Pan-American Health Organization, the WHO has set up a 
COVAX facility with the aim of accelerating the development, manufacture 
and equitable distribution of vaccines to every country. The rationale is that 
unless every country has a fair access to the vaccine, no country will be immune 
to the consequences of the disease.  For many small countries, this is very 
helpful because unlike the United States and other OECD countries, they have 
limited capacities for the development, manufacture, distribution and effective 
administration of the COVID-19 vaccines. See COVAX, Working for global 
equitable access to COVID-19 vaccines, WHO, 
https://www.who.int/initiatives/act-accelerator/covax (last visited May 17, 
2021).   
83 Makenga, supra note 82, at 3. 
84 See id. at 3–4. 
85 Currently, there is a significant push for inclusive access to the 
COVID-19 vaccine and the WHO is a critical partner in this effort. See Ann 
Danaiya Usher, COVID-19 Vaccines For All?, 395 LANCET 1822, 1823 (2020). 
Without this effort to make the vaccine accessible to all countries—rich and 
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol33/iss2/2
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especially in advising states and partners––are registration of 
products, inspections and licensing of manufacturers, inspection 
and licensing of distributors, continued surveillance, and 
authorization of clinical trials.86 
Interestingly these efforts can also run into diplomatic 
tensions between Member States themselves, on the one hand, 
and between the WHO and Member States on the other hand.87  
The interests of sovereigns and the limits of modest 
international law has come to the fore once more.88  One 
significant example is the China-US relationship within the 
WHO and the impact it may be having on the implementation of 
the strategic plan to stop the COVID-19 pandemic.  At several 
points, the United States Government has accused China of not 
telling the whole truth about the pandemic's emergence and 
transmission.89  Some policy commentators have also accused 
the WHO of whitewashing the China story.90  Others have 
accused China of failing to uphold its responsibilities91 under the 
 
poor—it will be difficult for many communities around the world to have access 
to this life saving drug. See Lawrence O. Gostin, Safura Abdool Karim & 
Benjamin Mason Meier, Facilitating Access to a COVID-19 Vaccine through 
Global Health Law, 48 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 622, 623 (2020). 
86 Dep’t of Vaccines & Other Biologicals, World Health Org. [WHO], 
Regulation of Vaccines: Building on Existing Drug Regulatory Authorities, at 
9, WHO Doc. WHO/V&B/99.10 (Aug. 1999), 
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/65968/WHO_V-
B_99.10_eng.pdf?sequence=1.  
87 See generally Quintana & Uriburu, supra note 3, who argue that the 
crisis and tension arising from the COVID-19 pandemic could be useful in 
helping develop norms of international law that will govern a post COVID-19 
era of international law. 
88 See Ugo Pagallo, Sovereigns, Viruses, and the Law: The Normative 
Challenges of Pandemic in Today’s Information Societies, 37 L. CONTEXT 11, 
15–21 (2020). 
89 See Jeff Stein et al., US officials crafting retaliatory actions against 
China over coronavirus as President Trump fumes, WASH. POST (Apr. 30, 2020, 
6:25 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/04/30/trump-china-
coronavirus-retaliation/; see also Sebastián Guidi & Nahuel Maisley, A Trillion 
Dollar Question: Who Should Pay for COVID-19?, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV. 3, 5, 32 
(forthcoming 2021). 
90 Selam Gebrekidan et al., In Hunt for Virus Source, W.H.O. Let China 
Take Charge, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/02/world/who-china-coronavirus.html. 
91 James Kraska, China Is Legally Responsible for COVID-19 Damage 
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International Health Regulations (IHR).92  The Chinese 
government has denied all of these allegations.93  Instead, it 
continued to maintain that it followed the standard procedure 
for responding to global health challenges under the WHO's 
auspices.94  
The legal quandary that exists currently is the extent of the 
obligation of a state in international law following the outbreak 
of pandemics in its territory.  More so, the rapid nature of the 
transmissions that often follow epidemics—especially in this age 
of people's fast global movement––is a prime obstacle to 
accountability.  As we have seen, finding out the real moment of 
the outbreak is critical.  That is why the WHO insists on 
transparency and early reporting of the outbreak of pandemics.95  
The Trump administration did not seem satisfied, and 
 
and Claims Could Be In The Trillions, WAR ON THE ROCKS (Mar. 23, 2020), 
https://warontherocks.com/2020/03/china-is-legally-responsible-for-covid-19-
damage-and-claims-could-be-in-the-trillions/. 
92 See generally WHO, INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (2005) 12 
(2d ed. 2008) [hereinafter WHO INT’L HEALTH REGS.] (“Each State Party shall 
notify WHO, by the most efficient means of communication available . . . and 
within 24 hours of assessment of public health information, of all events which 
may constitute a public health emergency of international concern within its 
territory . . . .”). 
93 See Damien Cave & Amy Qin, China Mounts Aggressive Defense to 
Calls for Coronavirus Compensation, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/28/world/asia/coronavirus-china-
compensation.html.  
94 See id.; Those who want China to pay virus compensation are 
daydreaming – diplomat, REUTERS (May 24, 2020, 3:52 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-parliament-coronavirus-
lawsuit/those-who-want-china-to-pay-virus-compensation-are-daydreaming-
diplomat-idUSKBN23007O. For a detailed timeline of events occurring 
between December 31, 2019, and July 10, 2020, concerning the WHO’s 
response to the emerging virus in China, see Morgan Winsor, Timeline: WHO’s 
response to the coronavirus pandemic and the ensuing controversy, ABC News 
(Aug. 15, 2020, 4:00 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Health/timeline-response-
coronavirus-pandemic-ensuing-controversy/story?id=71690767.  
95 WHO INT’L HEALTH REGS., supra note 92, at 12; see generally P. 
O’Malley, J. Rainford & A. Thompson, Transparency During Public Health 
Emergencies: From Rhetoric to Reality, 87 BULLETIN OF THE WORLD HEALTH 
ORGANIZATION [WHO] 614 (2009), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2733257/pdf/08-056689.pdf 
(explaining the WHO’s rationale behind transparency).  
20https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol33/iss2/2
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threatened to withdraw from the WHO.96  Equally, Washington 
continued to suggest that the name given97 to the pandemic 
should have been something else suggesting the origins of the 
disease instead of  COVID-19 as it is currently named.98  The 
WHO insists that it has since abandoned the practice of naming 
diseases after the places where such diseases first occurred 
because of the potential unintended negative consequences99 
arising from this practice. The emergence of the Biden 
Administration seems to have reduced the tension despite the 
outstanding concerns about transparency and due compliance 
with WHO regulations by state parties.100  
Many have seen the contestation between China and the 
United States as an extension of their current global strategic 
rivalry and, as such, consider it unhelpful.101  The increasing 
significance of China as a force in global policymaking—in trade, 
finance, infrastructural development, supply chains, and 
military capacity—significantly influences how the rest of the 
world, especially the US and other Security Council members, 
 
96 All Things Considered, President Trump Announces That U.S. Will 
Leave WHO, NPR (May 29, 2020, 4:02 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2020/05/29/865685798/president-trump-announces-that-
u-s-will-leave-who. 
97 See Fernando Prieto-Ramos, Jiamin Pei & Le Cheng, Institutional 
and News Media Denominations of COVID-19 and its Causative Virus: 
Between Naming Policies and Naming Politics, 14 DISCOURSE & COMMC’N 635, 
636 (2020), for the rationale behind the naming of COVID-19.  
98 See Zaria Gorvett, The tricky politics of naming the new coronavirus, 
BBC FUTURE (Feb. 16, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20200214-
coronavirus-swine-flu-and-sars-how-viruses-get-their-names, which notes 
arising concerns surrounding the naming of virus species after places of origin.  
99 Yi-Zheng Lian, Why Did the Coronavirus Outbreak Start in China? 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/20/opinion/sunday/coronavirus-china-
cause.html; WHO issues best practices for naming new human infectious 
diseases, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (May 8, 2015), 
https://www.who.int/news/item/08-05-2015-who-issues-best-practices-for-
naming-new-human-infectious-diseases. 
100 Christina Morales, Biden restores ties with the World Health 
Organization that were cut by Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/20/world/biden-restores-who-ties.html.  
101 Lord Jim O’ Neill, Blaming China Is a Dangerous Distraction, 
CHATHAM HOUSE (Apr. 15, 2020), 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/04/blaming-china-dangerous-distraction. 
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engages with China.102  The difficulty in this is the potential 
capacity of such strategic rivalries to reduce critical 
international organizations such as the WHO into platforms of 
contestation.  States are reminded that whatever may be their 
grievances and strategic interests, transnational crises such as 
pandemics should be prioritized because of the apparent 
devastation it can have on the wellbeing of all societies if the 
responses are compromised.103 
The current contestation is threatening the WHO's 
financing, 104 which will negatively affect its mandate delivery 
capacity if left unchecked.  To carry out its functions effectively, 
the WHO relies on the financial contributions of state parties.  
State parties are therefore obliged to fulfill their financial 
obligations as a way of not only upholding their membership, but 
also complying with their apportioned dues to the 
organization.105  
It is in line with this established legal foundation that the 
WHO can pursue its objectives by apportioning levies or dues on 
Member States through donations, gifts, and bequests from the 
general public.  For example, the WHO's program budget for the 
2020-2021 fiscal year was presented to the World Health 
Assembly (WHA) in May 2019, and was subsequently adopted in 
resolution WHA72.1.106  In the proposed budget, the WHO 
captures its proposed programs for the period and focuses its aim 
at strengthening accountability.107  It leverages its own vision of 
expanding global access to healthcare but also aims to integrate 
 
102 See generally THOMAS LUM ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL34620, 
COMPARING GLOBAL INFLUENCE: CHINA’S AND U.S. DIPLOMACY, FOREIGN AID, 
TRADE, AND INVESTMENT IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD (2008). 
103 See O’ Neill, supra note 101. 
104 Jacobs, Shear & Wong, supra note 41. 
105 Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 
I.C.J. 151, 164 (July 20). 
106 See World Health Org. [WHO], Assembly Res. 72.1 (2019), in 
Seventy-Second World Health Assembly: Resolutions and Decisions, at 3–5, 
WHO Doc. WHA72/2019/REC/1 (2019), for the resolution adopting the budget; 
and World Health Org. [WHO], Programme Budget 2020–2021, WHO Doc. 
WHO/PRP/19.1 (May 2019) [hereinafter WHO Budget 2020–21], for the final 
version of the budget. 
107 WHO Budget 2020–21, supra note 106, at 6–8, 13. 
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key aspects of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
into the policy framework of the WHO.108 
When these finances are withheld or compromised because 
of diplomatic spats between states, it diminishes the capacity of 
the WHO to stop pandemics, such as COVID-19.  It is crucial to 
remind states of the overarching obligation which they have 
towards these essential multilateral platforms.  Hence, denial of 
funding is an extreme measure—especially when there are clear 
dispute settlement mechanisms within the international 
organization's constitutional framework.109  Thus, any tensions 
arising from the due execution of the WHO’s mandate are 
remediable through the several dispute settlement mechanisms 
recognized under the constitution and Chapter VI of the United 
Nations Charter.110   
IV.   DISPUTES SETTLEMENT 
The arena of international law and policy is, in a sense, an 
arena of contestation between states.111  The existence of 
international organizations mitigates these contestations by 
providing platforms upon which the interests of states and 
organizations can be harmonized and channeled towards human 
wellbeing, creating justification for multilateral frameworks like 
the WHO.112  Because of the wide-ranging continued state 
interest, even after forming an international organization like 
the WHO, global affairs disputes continue to arise.113  However, 
there are international health regulations that govern responses 
 
108 Id. at 4. 
109 WHO Const., supra note 1, arts. 75–77. 
110 Id.; U.N. Charter arts. 33–38. 
111 For a full examination into the politics of international law, see 
Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law, 1 EUR. J. INT’L L. 4 
(1990) [hereinafter Koskenniemi 1]; and Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of 
International Law – 20 Years Later, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 7 (2009).  
112 Jennifer Shkabatur, A Global Panopticon - The Changing Role of 
International Organizations in the Information Age, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 159, 
165 (2011).  
113 See, for example, Ching-Fu Lin, COVID-19 and the Institutional 
Resilience of the IHR (2005): Time for a Dispute Settlement Redesign?, 13 
CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 269 (2020), who addresses the disputes arising from 
non-compliance with the WHO’s International Health Regulations during the 
COVID-19 pandemic. 
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to pandemics and how disputes may be resolved.  These 
regulations, prepared and accepted by WHO Member States, are 
important to resolving controversies that arise in the course of 
fighting pandemics.  As has been revealed by the COVID-19 
global pandemic, these disputes can be on even small subject 
matters such as distributing test kits and travel advisories by 
the WHO.114 
Nothing is insignificant in the affairs of states.  The 
coordination of the global health response to the pandemic has 
now clearly exhibited the diplomatic trappings of the work of the 
WHO.  This assertion rests on two key grounds.  First, the WHO 
has become a global platform for states to engage each other and 
deliberate on subject matters that are essential to human 
resilience around the world.115  The WHO’s capacity to articulate 
programs and offer top notch advice on health issues further 
heightens its diplomatic importance for states that may wish to 
engage in proxy foreign policy wars through the WHO.  Second, 
the WHO has become a major advocate for access to health care, 
nutrition, water, and sanitation around the world.116  The voice 
of the WHO gives life to these issues in ways that are 
remarkably beyond national and international civil society 
organizations’ capacity.  Thus, the WHO's policy voice may have 
political ramifications for states—especially in the COVID-19 
influenced political economy.  For instance, in the ongoing fight 
against COVID-19, the WHO’s recommendation of wearing 
masks to prevent the spread of the disease has been significant 
in convincing otherwise skeptical states to adopt the directive.117  
More so, the accessibility of vaccines to states—especially highly 
 
114 See id. at 273–77.  
115 See generally WHO REG’L OFF. EUR., BUILDING RESILIENCE: A KEY 
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indebted, emerging countries—will likely depend greatly on the 
WHO's diplomatic voice.  These states will often turn to the 
WHO for health policy advice on vaccines––including 
acquisition, storage, and safe administration of the vaccine.118 
Therefore, it is not difficult to see that the WHO’s primary 
mandate may trigger anxious behavior from some frontline 
states.  Undoubtedly, the politics of international law knows no 
boundaries.119  In other words, every opportunity for global 
engagement is a foreign policy opportunity.120  At the minimum, 
such opportunities are principally soft power opportunities that 
cannot be taken lightly.  While this is the legitimate right of 
states, it is important not to destroy the institutions in a zero-
sum quest for national interests; hence the need to ensure global 
health policy does not suffer because of the failure of 
international cooperation.121 
Owing to the increased capacities of international 
organizations like the WHO to influence global discourse and 
shape policies, many dispute settlement methods and 
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121 Note that disputes arising from contractual obligations of 
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2004). 
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approaches exist.122  These approaches include negotiation, 
mediation, inquiry, conciliation, arbitration, and litigation.123  
Within the WHO Constitution, the governing rules on dispute 
settlement can be found in Articles 75, 76, and 77.124  In 
particular, Article 75 provides that: “[a]ny question or dispute 
concerning the interpretation or application of this Constitution 
which is not settled by negotiation or by the Health Assembly 
shall be referred to the International Court of Justice . . . unless 
the parties concerned agree on another mode of settlement.”125 
Prima facie, Article 75 privileges negotiation as a primary 
means of dispute settlement.  This provision is in line with 
Article 2(3) of the United Nations Charter, which underscores 
the peaceful settlement of disputes in a manner that does not 
compromise international peace and security.126  This was 
reiterated by the United Nations General Assembly resolution 
on friendly relations.127 
 
122 Michael Wood, The Settlement of International Disputes to Which 
International Organizations are Parties, in Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the 
Work of Its Sixty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/71/10, annex A, at 389–94 
(2016).  
123 See J. G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 2 (6th ed. 
2017) (quoting G.A. Res. 2626 (XXV), annex (Oct. 24, 1970)). 
124 WHO Const., supra note 1, arts. 75–77. 
125 Id. art 75. 
126 U.N. Charter art. 2(3). 
127 G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States in Accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations (Oct. 24, 1970). The UN General 
Assembly Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations, during a commemorative session to celebrate the twenty-
fifth anniversary of the United Nations (U.N. Doc. A/PV.1883), emphasized the 
peaceful settlement of disputes. Id. Precisely, the Declaration states that 
“States shall . . . seek early and just settlement of their international disputes 
by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial 
settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful 
means of their choice.” Id. This resolution was also remarkable in that it was 
adopted without a vote. Declaration on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations – Procedural History, AUDIOVISUAL LIBR. 
OF INT’L L., https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/dpilfrcscun/dpilfrcscun.html (last visited 
Apr. 8, 2021).  
26https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol33/iss2/2
2021 COVID-19 and Global Health Policy 215 
On the other hand, referrals to the ICJ for advisory 
opinion128 are usually dependent upon due authorization by the 
United Nations General Assembly.129  This has been the case in 
disputes such as the relocation of the WHO’s regional office from 
Alexandria, Egypt which was adjudicated before the ICJ.130  It 
must be noted that the privilege of negotiation does not foreclose 
other methods of dispute settlement.  Parties are left with an 
open choice to adopt other peaceful means of settling disputes.131  
It also means that techniques such as mediation, inquiry, 
consultation, conciliation, arbitration, and litigation may be 
adopted to resolve these disputes.132 
Therefore, it is often unnecessary to engage in zero-sum 
strategic games when there are established pathways and 
mechanisms for dispute settlements in international 
organizations like the WHO.  As such, it is argued that the 
United States and China should have avoided drawing the WHO 
into their strategic contentions, mostly over matters that are as 
serious as a global pandemic.  State parties to the WHO should 
therefore refrain from using pandemics to further their zero-sum 
strategic games.133  Pandemics do not recognize boundaries, nor 
do they know about sovereigns. 
 
128 See generally Dapo Akande, The Competence of International 
Organizations and the Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court of 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
The COVID-19 pandemic has brought the world to a 
moment of reckoning.  The reckoning has ranged from taking a 
fresh look at socioeconomic inequality to radical nationalism’s 
failures.  The pandemic has also unveiled many other lessons.  
One inescapable lesson from it is that the world has become very 
integrated, and many of the problems of the 21st century would 
demand deeper collaborations across state boundaries, 
identities, class, cultural, and ideological differences.  This 
entails both a horizontal and vertical collaboration between 
states—big and small.  No state can do it alone, and the 
sustainability of any collaborative effort is measurable by the 
strength of the weakest state.  
More so, knowledge and real-time access to reliable 
information are central to sustainable development, health for 
all, and global peace.  Those with the knowledge and means to 
act responsibly will be better positioned to tackle the menace of 
global pandemics.  The WHO and other international 
organizations are critical to finding lasting and sustainable 
solutions to these problems.  In that regard, they ought to be 
insulated from the political and global strategic games of 
Member States.  Where conflicts emerge despite state parties’ 
best efforts, it is vital to use the accepted means of dispute 
settlement to resolve all such contentions.  In other words, 
whatever misgivings may arise in tackling joint problems like 
global pandemics, states must focus on using specific dispute 
resolution mechanisms to settle their disputes.  The United 
Nations Charter, in its Chapter VI, emphasizes the peaceful 
settlement of disputes134 and this should be borne in mind at all 
times in the international relations of states.  It is imperative 
not to defeat the mandate of the WHO since the whole world—
especially the underprivileged communities—will suffer the 
most devastating consequence of policy failures arising from 
these contestations.  Even significantly prosperous economies 
like India and Brazil can suffer direly due to failures arising 
from inadequate policy interventions in health care due to 
strategic games or limited collaboration amongst states.  
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The world is at a new threshold of international law and 
relations amongst states.  This is a moment to recalibrate and 
reform,135 rather than relegate multilateralism for inclusive 
development and shared prosperity.  The pandemic’s unmatched 
lesson is the fragility of all human societies and the need for 
cooperation amongst states.136  One state alone cannot respond 
to grand global challenges—such as climate change and 
pandemics.  Therefore, there is no gainsaying that humanity will 
pay a steep price whenever IOs such as WHO are turned into 
arenas of strategic zero-sum games.137  International epidemics 
are global security issues138 and should not be approached with 
a power game mentality, let alone a zero-sum game approach.  
Rather, these organizations are spaces for seeking enduring 
collective answers to common problems like pandemics.139  Thus, 
it is in the enlightened self-interest of all states to abide by 
settled norms, rather than to engage in the festival of corpses in 
the name of strategic contestations during pandemics.  This will 
defeat the WHO’s human rights140 essence—to ensure the 
highest attainable standard of health for all peoples. 
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